Originally composed in 2015 for a class analyzing the efficacy of international governmental organizations in the United Nations. In 2016, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi eventually held his trial at the Hague and plead guilty to the destruction of religious and historical sites in the Malian city of Timbuktu and sentenced to nine years in jail, setting a precedent in the ICC.
Organized in 1999, a group of jihadist militants formed an organization which essentially mirrored the already-existent Al-Qaeda of Afghanistan, which has dubbed their common referential name, Al-Qaeda in Iraq. “Since September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda has been the most publicized of [terrorist] groups.”[1] This Iraqi organization gave their allegiance to the already-known militant and leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. This alignment sought negative ramifications as their attacks became more prevalent and more violent. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as it is formally known, is the current name of the said organization led for the destruction of the Shi’ite Muslims and their culture. This long-standing battle between the Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims have been what fueled much of the aggression in the Middle East for centuries.
Due to the anarchical status of Iraq at the time, these militants sought organized authority to fuel their leadership. As international disputes waged in the Middle East, ISIL was just one of the organizations which gained prevalence for those wanting the authority to be led by a Sunni Muslim. The suppression of the Shi’ites was the motivation of this organization and eventually led to the destruction of the oppositions’ culture completely.
Acts of “cultural cleansing” began as these extremist participated in iconoclasm across the Middle East. Iconoclasm, as previously referred, is considered the destruction of religious and other political monuments, art, or buildings. As described by economist, Thomas C. Shelling, “Pain and shock, loss and grief, privation and horror are always in some degree, sometimes in terrible degree among the results of warfare…The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.”[2] Efforts of destroying every monument, mosque, or heritage site meaning something to the Shi’ite Muslims or organizations that differ from the Sunni Muslims has been the main motivation.[3] One of first sites to be destroyed was Timbuktu and other sites located in West Africa.
Timbuktu, an ancient city located in the West-African country of Mali, became a large epicenter of trade during the 12th century and is occupied still today. Important structures such as the 15th- and 16th-century mausoleums of Sidi Mahmoud, Sidi Moctar, and Alpha Moya have already been destroyed, despite the protection insisted by the Mali officials.[4] These mausoleums and other mosques within the area signified and played, “an essential role in the spread of Islam in Africa at an early period.”[5] With the destruction of these sites comes the destruction of the Islamic footprint of West Africa. Terrorist-like acts such as these have caused the primary upset and dishevelment behind the world-wide outcry for the protection of these cultural heritage sites and history in general.
Reactions came worldwide as news sources began to print, “Timbuktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists Are Wrecking Mali’s Cultural Heritage,”[6] or “The Desecration of Timbuktu: Fleeing Islamists Destroy Priceless Treasures Before French Forces Closed In,”[7] or even “Mali Islamists Destroy Tombs in Timbuktu.”[8] Each of the articles took the sides of protectionists and described these acts as “barbarian” and “unjustified.” These terrorist attacks fall in line with the primary reasons outlined with other extreme religious positions. Previous religious conflicts have been the between the Northern Irish Catholics and British Protestants, or between the Hindus and Muslims in India.[9]
Following these destructions, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a plan which would allow regional leaders forty-five days to provide intervention to oust the rebels in Mali.[10] This resolution came not only from the destruction of cultural heritage sites, but an enveloping spread of sharia law. Strict accordance of sharia law views the destroyed mausoleums and other monuments as idolatrous and un-Islamic, allows for amputations for thieves and stoning of adulterers, while also forcing women to go veiled.[11] Along with these gruesome treatments, extremists are also, “paying the children’s families $600—a major incentive in a country where more than half the population lives on $1.25 a day” to work as child soldiers.[12] Much of the aforementioned treatments fall in line with human rights violations, thus forcing the United Nations’ resolution to encourage military protections of these civilians. By enabling leaders to send military enforcement to these areas, it allowed for the movement away from these endangered cultural heritage sites, which was strongly encouraged by an offshoot of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Science, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
UNESCO acts as an organization which encourages networks of nations by mobilizing for education, building intercultural understanding, pursuing scientific cooperation, and protecting freedom of expression. Originally organized in 1945, UNESCO acts as the “intellectual” agency of the United Nations.[13] In 1972, UNESCO adopted the World Heritage Programme and committee under the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World’s Cultural and Natural Heritage.
It was under the direction of the UNESCO Director-General, Irina Bokova, that UNESCO “called” for “the belligerents to cease the destruction immediately”[14] when referring to the three sacred Timbuktu tombs.[15] While UNESCO is a part of the United Nations, it commonly lacks the ability to exhibit acts of aggression or armament of persons for the protection from these militants. Therefore, the only way they are able to act is vicariously through their encouragement of others. Through Bokova’s statement, Timbuktu was then again placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger.
It was through these designations that the Government of Mali was able to refer this situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 13 July 2012.[16] Under the Rome Statute, Article 8, Clause 2b, Subsection (ix), referring to the Geneva Convention, it deems that “Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives” is a “war crime”.[17] Therefore, under these credentials, the acts committed in Mali constitute a war crime for which the leader of the militant group, Ahmad Al Faqi Mahdi, has been charged. The ICC acts as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) whose jurisdiction spreads over the prosecution of individuals for international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. However good in nature, the ICC is a controversial arm to the United Nations, as states believe it may infringe on their sovereignty and extend jurisdiction too far—such is the case with the United States.[18]
With all IGOs, it suffers great difficulty when dealing with their jurisdiction and the prosecution and enforcement. As expressed by political realist, John J. Mearsheimer, IGOs only operate on the basis that states must choose to obey the rules IGOs created.[19]
The aforementioned case is currently in the trial process, scheduled for 22 August 2016. This trial will set a precedence for future crimes against similar cultural heritage sites worldwide.
Under the current conditions, the efficacy of UNESCO is at a stalemate as they, another IGO, cannot act as their own enforcer as it might encroach on the sovereignty of other nations. Therefore, UNESCO can only call upon nations, organizations, or others to protect these sites. However, with the classification granted by UNESCO, it has allowed nations to bring charges to the ICC against the militants.
After the case is brought to the ICC, the individual must be attained via a warrant for their arrest, which may prove to be the difficult end of the deal. Again, as the ICC acts as an IGO, they cannot infringe on a state’s sovereignty if the state is not signatories. Therefore, this poses four probable cases, as outlined by the Director of the International Justice Program Human Rights Watch, Richard Dicker:
(1) arrest where the suspect is already in the custody of the state where the alleged crimes occurred and is then arrested and surrendered for trial to the court (Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, DRC);
(2) apprehension by the national authorities of a suspect for crimes allegedly committed on the territory of another state followed by surrender to the court (Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Belgium);
(3) situations of armed conflict where the territorial government is unable to apprehend a suspect through a law enforcement operation and arrest takes on a military aspect in an operation involving troops acting extraterritorially (Joseph Kony, DRC, Central African Republic); and
(4) a recalcitrant government that is implicated in the crimes alleged shields one of its own and refuses to arrest a suspect whose whereabouts are well known (Omar al-Bashir, Sudan).[20]
As stated in the last two circumstances, the court is stymied when the governments are not cooperating, or there is excessive military force needed to detain the individual. As for the Al Mahdi case surrounding the desecration of Timbuktu, the Government of Mali was able to capture him and bring him into the custody for the ICC; however, not all cases are that simple.
Seeing how the Rome Statute, the international rule of law followed by the ICC, only applies to the signatories. Therefore, if the state is not a signatory, they have no mandatory role in the protocol by which they must follow to bring these individuals to court. Therefore, as cases have the ability to be brought to the ICC for trial, prosecution can only be enforced if there is a sense of international cooperation. In total, the ICC again is stymied with the status of international anarchy.
While analyzing this case and process therein, a liberal political thinker would greatly encourage states to apply as the compliance with international law ensures order. The collective actions expressed allows for a great importance or future cooperation.
Conversely, realists would analyze the situation primarily as a skepticism of cooperation and an understanding that states should only comply with international law when it is in their self-interest. Realist thinkers, “do not put much faith in the United Nations” expressed by the previous failures in collective approaches to punish aggressors.[21] According to Mearsheimer, war is inevitable and sometimes necessary; however, it is commonly negatively referenced in American perspectives.[22]
As the Al Mahdi case might be an international milestone for the protection of cultural heritage sites at an ICC level, there lacks a great overarching enforcement of such crimes. Realists will argue that with the current status of anarchy, states will only comply if it is in their self-interest. If the state’s government does not see these sites as important, they have no legal obligation to take such actions. Therefore, IGOs such as UNESCO and the ICC hold little to no power with contentious states.
[1] Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 280.
[2] Thomas C. Shelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence,” in Essential Readings in World Politics, ed. Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 401.
[3] These Sunni Muslims are extremists of their own right and do not speak to the greater Sunni population.
[4] Irina Bokova, “UNESCO Director-General of UNESCO Calls for a Halt to Destruction of Cultural Heritage Site in Timbuktu,” 30 June 2012, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/901/.
[5] “Timbuktu,” UNESCO, accessed 27 July 2016, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119.
[6] Ishaan Tharoor, “Timbuktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists Are Wrecking Mali’s Cultural Heritage,” 02 July 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wrecking-malis-cultural-heritage/.
[7] Matt Blake, “The Desecration of Timbuktu: Fleeing Islamists Destroy Priceless Treasures Before French Forces Closed In,” 28 January 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2269521/Timbuktu-treasures-destroyed-Islamists-French-in.html.
[8] Amir Ahmed, “Mali Islamists Destroy Tombs in Timbuktu,” 19 October 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/world/africa/mali-shrines/.
[9] Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, 280.
[10] Faith Karimi, “U.N. Security Council Seeks Detailed Mali Military Intervention Plan,” 13 October 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/13/world/africa/mali-un-resolution/index.html.
[11] Matt Blake, “The Desecration of Timbuktu: Fleeing Islamists Destroy Priceless Treasurers Before French Forces Closed In.”
[12] Faith Karimi, “U.N. Security Council Seeks Detailed Mali Military Intervention Plan.”
[13] “Introducing UNESCO,” accessed 27 July 2016, http://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco.
[14] Irina Bokova, “UNESCO Director-General of UNESCO Calls for a Halt to Destruction of Cultural Heritage Site in Timbuktu.”
[15] The entire city of Timbuktu, Mali was placed on UNESCO’s List of World Heritage Sites in 1988.
[16] The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Case Information Sheet, updated June 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/AlMahdiEng.pdf.
[17] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, International Criminal Court, accessed 27 July 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf.
[18] Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, 373.
[19] John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” in Essential Readings in World Politics, ed. Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 355.
[20] Richard Dicker, “Ramping Up Strategies for ICC Arrests: A Few Lessons Learned,” accessed 28 July 2016, http://iccforum.com/arrest.
[21] Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, 242.
[22] Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 361.
